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2.1  生産関数 















































2.3  外部委託 
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5.2  交渉配分が小さいケース 
 
 (21)










 0 1  
(14)  












7 a 14  
 
5.3  交渉配分が中位のケース 
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The labor skill and the entry-mode decision of the firm 




The purpose of this paper is to debate on entry-mode decision of less 
productive firms in a developing country whether to procure a specific 
intermediate in a vertically integrated subsidiary overseas or to outsource it 
to an unaffiliated supplier abroad, and to deliberate on the choice of the entry 
modes from the view point of social welfare. As a result of the analysis, labor 
intensiveness of the final good promotes headquarter, or, final good producer, 
to employ its production in a subsidiary, and capital intensiveness of the final 
good or higher bargaining weight in outsourcing promotes outsourcing its 
production. However, analyzing the entry modes from the perspective of 
social welfare by using comparative statics, there exist some cases where it is 
preferable to choose the outsourcing [vertical integration] rather than the 
vertical integration [outsourcing], through the effect of the consumer surplus. 
